Archive for the ‘Protectionism’ Category

Non-discriminatory treatment in domestic commerce

Thursday, October 21st, 2010

A recent court ruling that led to the repeal of an import prohibition on agricultural products may not be covered at the IELP Blog, because it’s a purely domestic matter:

The city of Lake Elmo [in Minnesota] imposed the protectionist law in 2008, requiring that all agricultural produce sold on Lake Elmo’s farms must actually be grown in Lake Elmo. This would have significantly damaged the Bergmanns, and others like them, who grow produce elsewhere and sell it from their Lake Elmo farm. Judge Noel’s opinion recommended that a preliminary injunction be issued preventing the law from being enforced while the Institute for Justice lawsuit is litigated. The City Council’s change in the law now makes a preliminary injunction unnecessary.

Google wants to influence trade negotiations

Saturday, September 11th, 2010

USTR Ron Kirk visited Google last week for a round table on “Supporting Silicon Valley in the Global Economy.” One of the big headlines coming out of event is an argument, pushed by Google, that online censorship is a trade barrier.

The analogy/conflation between web openness and trade openness seems increasingly prevalent. The Economist devoted a cover story to the internet’s openness earlier this month and said that “the internet is as much a trade pact as an invention… Just as a free-trade agreement between countries increases the size of the market and boosts gains from trade, so the internet led to greater gains from the exchange of data and allowed innovation to flourish.”

While at some level the analogy is appropriate because there are common lessons, such as the fact that specialization is limited by the size of the market, I doubt that it’s as valuable when discussing the nuts and bolts of such (informational or economic) exchanges or the policies that should be adopted. But Google is pushing it hard:

Chief Legal Officer David Drummond… said Google is seeing an “alarming increase” in governments around the world censoring the Web, and he called on the U.S. government to treat the issue much as it would if a foreign nation was blocking the trade of physical goods.

“If this was happening with physical trade, we’d all be saying this violates trade agreements,” he said…

Drummond said barriers take several forms, such as blocking access to Google’s YouTube video service or by imposing licensing requirements that stipulate the company must install servers within a country in order to create a “local presence”–a definition that subjects content on those servers to local laws.

This argument, as presented by the WSJ, isn’t consistent with WTO law. Trade barriers discriminate between domestically produced goods and imports produced abroad. To quote myself:

Banning the consumption of tradable goods and services isn’t a WTO violation per se; international trade law emphasizes non-discrimination in the treatment of foreign and domestic products. Consider Antigua’s online gambling case against the US at the WTO. The basis for its claims was not that the US was obliged to allow online gambling, but that if it allowed domestic online gambling (such as allowed by the Interstate Horseracing Act), it was obliged by its GATS commitments to also allow online gambling provided by foreign suppliers. Similarly, I suspect that censorship only constitutes a trade barrier if foreign sources of information are censored more heavily than domestic providers, i.e. a difference in national treatment.

In short, “free trade” doesn’t mean “everything goes” and local laws can’t govern consumption. Free trade means non-discrimination with respect to producers’ origins.

The more plausible line of argument is that trade agreements can be used as leverage in negotiating non-trade issues:

“In our view at Google it’s high time for us to start really sinking our teeth into this one,” said Drummond.

“We have great opportunities now with pending trade agreements to start putting some pressure on countries to recognize that Internet freedom not only is a core value — that we should be holding them to account from a human rights standpoint — but also that if you want to be part of the community of free trade, you are going to have to find a way to allow the Internet to be open.”

But making trade negotiations contingent on pledges against government censorship doesn’t mean that Chinese-style internet censorship constitutes a trade barrier in the traditional WTO sense.

PTAs and the incidence of antidumping actions

Sunday, August 29th, 2010

Preferential trade agreements spur discriminatory anti-dumping practices:

“In this paper we empirically explore the possibility of additional discrimination via PTAs by focusing on the extent to which PTAs alter the pattern of antidumping (AD) activity… AD provisions in PTAs have decreased the number of intra-PTA AD cases by 33-55% and increased the number of AD actions against non-PTA members by 10-30%… PTAs without AD language do not experience any change in AD activity whereas PTAs with AD rules are characterized by protection reduction and protection diversion.”

Just as it’s difficult to assess the net benefits of trade creation minus trade diversion, it’s likely tough to discern the net benefit of PTAs’ AD clauses in terms of protection reduction minus protection diversion.

What’s the growth cost of developed countries’ tariffs?

Friday, August 13th, 2010

Oddly, I didn’t come across this paper until just now:

John Romalis, “Market Access, Openness, and Growth”, NBER Working Paper 13048, 2007 (ungated version):

This paper identifies a causal effect of openness to international trade on growth. It does so by using tariff barriers of the United States as instruments for the openness of developing countries. Trade liberalization by a large trading partner causes an expansion in the trade of other countries. Trade expansion induced by greater market access appears to cause a quantitatively large acceleration in the growth rates of developing countries. Eliminating existing developed world tariffs would increase developing country trade to GDP ratios by one third and growth rates by 0.6 to 1.6 percent per annum.

Irwin on Smoot-Hawley

Friday, June 18th, 2010

Via the WSJ, we learn that Doug Irwin is writing a book titled The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Great Depression. It’s due next year from Princeton University Press.

While most economists do not hold the Smoot-Hawley tariff responsible for the Great Depression itself, it contributed to a sharp decline in world trade. The tariff slashed U.S. dutiable imports by about 15%, for example. Even worse, it spawned protectionism abroad…

The damage wrought by this tariff had only one silver lining. Ever since, the ghosts of Reed Smoot and Willis Hawley (a Republican congressman from Oregon) have stood in the way of anyone arguing for higher trade barriers. They almost singlehandedly made the term “protectionist” an insult rather than a compliment.

Presumably Professor Irwin’s 1998 REStat paper provides some preview of how he’ll approach the technical portion of the book:

In the two years after the imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in June 1930, the volume of U.S. imports fell over 40%. To what extent can this collapse of trade be attributed to the tariff itself versus other factors such as declining income or foreign retaliation? Partial and general equilibrium assessments indicate that the Smoot-Hawley tariff itself reduced imports by 4-8% (ceteris paribus), although the combination of specific duties and deflation further raised the effective tariff and reduced imports an additional 8-10%. A counterfactual simulation suggests that nearly a quarter of the observed 40% decline in imports can be attributed to the rise in the effective tariff (i.e., Smoot-Hawley plus deflation).

Schumer attacks international phone calls

Monday, May 31st, 2010

Would a 25-cent specific tariff on importing customer service phone calls violate US WTO obligations?

Reuters: In a bid to reduce outsourcing of U.S. jobs, a Democratic senator said on Sunday he will push legislation to make companies inform customers when their calls were being transferred outside the United States and charge companies for those transferred calls…

Schumer’s bill would also impose a $0.25 excise tax on any customer service call placed inside the United States which is transferred to an agent in a foreign location. The fee would be assessed on the company that transferred the call.

Stiglitz on renminbi revaluation

Wednesday, April 7th, 2010

Joe Stiglitz’s latest column at Project Syndicate warns the US against starting a trade war over China’s exchange rate.

On perspective:

Even in absolute value, Saudi Arabia’s multilateral merchandise surplus of $212 billion in 2008 dwarfs China’s $175 billion surplus; as a percentage of GDP, Saudi Arabia’s current-account surplus, at 11.5% of GDP, is more than twice that of China. Saudi Arabia’s surplus would be far higher were it not for US armaments exports.

In a global economy with deficient aggregate demand, current-account surpluses are a problem. But China’s current-account surplus is actually less than the combined figure for Japan and Germany; as a percentage of GDP, it is 5%, compared to Germany’s 5.2%.

On politics:

China recognizes that its currency needs to appreciate over the long run, and politicizing the speed at which it does so has been counterproductive. (Since it began revaluing its exchange rate in July 2005, the adjustment has been half or more of what most experts think is required.) Moreover, starting a bilateral confrontation is unwise.

Since China’s multilateral surplus is the economic issue and many countries are concerned about it, the US should seek a multilateral, rules-based solution. Imposing unilateral duties after unilaterally labeling China a “currency manipulator” would undermine the multilateral system, with little payoff. China might respond by imposing duties on those American products effectively directly or indirectly subsidized by America’s massive bailouts of its banks and car companies.

No one wins from a trade war. So America should be wary of igniting one in the midst of an uncertain global recovery – as popular as it might be with politicians whose constituents are justly concerned about high unemployment, and as easy as it is to look for blame elsewhere.

Brazil, U.S. Agree to Avoid Tariffs in Cotton Dispute

Tuesday, April 6th, 2010

Bloomberg:

The Obama administration offered $147.3 million in assistance to Brazilian cotton producers and suspended an export-credit program for American farmers, in a bid to end a trade dispute with the Latin American nation.
The government will also seek to ease sanitary barriers to Brazilian imports of pork and beef, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said in a statement today on the preliminary deal. The U.S., which lost a World Trade Organization ruling in August that said its cotton subsidies violate global trade rules, will work with Brazil to reach a comprehensive agreement by June.
“We now have a clear path forward, one that is in the best interest of both the United States and Brazil,” Kirk said. “As a result of our discussions with Brazil we have avoided imposition of higher tariffs.”
The U.S. for now dodges as much as $830 million in trade sanctions on 102 goods including ketchup, cars and boats that Brazil targeted. In addition to financial assistance for Brazilian farmers, the U.S. halted the GSM-102 program that guarantees the credit foreign customers use to by American cotton, and said it will be restarted with higher fees.
Any other changes to U.S. cotton programs are pushed back until at least 2012, when the U.S. Congress will have to revisit the broader issue of farm subsidies before existing legislation governing the nation’s agriculture policies expires.

Censorship as a trade barrier

Saturday, March 20th, 2010

Gilbert Kaplan says that if Chinese censorship forces out US content companies like Google, the US should retaliate by erecting trade barriers to Chinese computer hardware exports. Nate Anderson at Ars Technica reports:

Dealing with censorship as a trade violation isn’t a new idea. Computer industry lobbying group CCIA was talking up trade complaints as a way to handle Chinese censorship back in January. CEO Ed Black said at the time, “It is increasingly apparent that censorship is a barrier to trade, and that China cannot limit the free flow of information and still comply with its international trade obligations. The Chinese government has said it is gathering more information before deciding how to proceed and we would urge that they look at the issue holistically with government, economic and trade officials involved in the decision.”

Of course, lobbyists aren’t the best source to describe trade law. I’d prefer to consult the folks at IELP, for example.

Banning the consumption of tradable goods and services isn’t a WTO violation per se; international trade law emphasizes non-discrimination in the treatment of foreign and domestic products. Consider Antigua’s online gambling case against the US at the WTO. The basis for its claims was not that the US was obliged to allow online gambling, but that if it allowed domestic online gambling (such as allowed by the Interstate Horseracing Act), it was obliged by its GATS commitments to also allow online gambling provided by foreign suppliers. Similarly, I suspect that censorship only constitutes a trade barrier if foreign sources of information are censored more heavily than domestic providers, i.e. a difference in national treatment.

If China censors both domestic and foreign internet sites, then it is unlikely that its WTO commitments oblige it to liberalize both. Thus, the line of thinking from folks like Dan Drezner and Simon Lester (1, 2) is that WTO law isn’t much of a tool to wield against Chinese censorship.

Discriminatory MFN tariffs: Specific tariffs in agriculture

Tuesday, February 2nd, 2010

Sohini Chowdhury, on the job market this year from Purdue University, on the “The Discriminatory Nature of Specific Tariffs“:

This paper evaluates the distortions from specific tariffs levied on agricultural imports by rich countries. Through their non-MFN ad valorem equivalents (AVEs), specific tariffs discriminate against exports from poor countries because of the lower price of their exports. So the MFN specific tariffs levied by rich WTO member countries essentially translate into higher tariff barriers for the exporters of low price goods, suggesting that the benefits of preferential tariffs that poor countries enjoy might be offset by the specific tariffs they face. Our results show that specific tariffs levied by rich countries on their agricultural imports wash away 80% of the welfare benefits and 73% of the market access benefits enjoyed by poor countries from preferential tariffs. A policy implication of this paper is that the WTO should intensify efforts to eliminate specific tariffs.