October 07, 2007
Palley on Comparative Advantage
Mark Thoma sends us to Thomas Palley's critique of modern trade policy. Frankly, I find much of his post rather confusing.
For example, Palley opens by writing:
The classical theory of comparative advantage has driven US trade policy for the past fifty years. That policy, in combination with technical innovations that have lowered costs of transportation and communication, has opened the global economy. Yet paradoxically, this opening has rendered classical trade theory obsolete. That in turn has left the US economically vulnerable because its trade policy remains stuck in the past and based on ideas that no longer hold.
US trade policy has been driven by the theory comparative advantage? I doubt this. Immediately after WWII, the founding of the GATT was largely motivated by the economic disaster of the interwar period and protectionism's exacerbation of international tensions in the 1930s. Once the GATT members started cutting tariffs, they largely liberalized industrial sectors, not areas in which poor countries had comparative advantage, like agriculture and textiles.
In fact, the motivation for new trade theory was the inability of the classic theory to explain trade:
For some time now there has been considerable skepticism about the ability of comparative cost theory to explain the actual pattern of international trade. Neither the extensive trade among the indsutrial countries nor the prevalence in this trade of two way exchanges of differentiated products make much sense in terms of standard theory. As a result many people have concluded that a new framework for analyzing trade is needed. [Paul Krugman, Rethinking International Trade, p.22]
Although Ricardian or Hecksher-Ohlin theories of comparative advantage may have constituted the bulk of trade theory prior to 1980, I think it would be very difficult to make the case that they were important determinants of US trade policy.
In his next paragraph, Palley writes:
The logic behind classical free trade is that all can benefit when countries specialize in producing those things in which they have comparative advantage. The necessary requirement is that the means of production (capital and technology) are internationally immobile and stuck in each country. That is what globalization has undone.
While it is true that the basic Hecksher-Ohlin model features KF and KH, this simple assumption is not critical to the logic of comparative advantage. Where there are differences in factor endowments and opportunity costs, there are potential gains from trade. If capital is more scarce in poor countries, then capital mobility will result in some rich country capital owners investing in the poor countries to earn higher returns. But only in the extreme case that all countries have the same proportional factor endowments will there be no potential gains from trade. Capital mobility is far from a "necessary requirement" for comparative advantage. See Paul Krugman and Don Boudreaux (pdf) for past encounters with this argument.
The rest of Thomas Palley's post is largely about empirical issues, but they are either well-worn (the "race to the bottom" arguments) or under-researched at present (trade and income inequality). I'll leave those for others to tackle.
Posted by Dingel at 02:18 PM | Comments (0)
September 24, 2007
"Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms"
You have likley already seen "Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms," as Andrew Bernard, Stephen Redding, and Peter Schott worked on it for more than four years. If you haven't, now is the time. The paper was finally published early this year in the Review of Economic Studies (journal pdf; older ungated pdf). It's a fabulous piece of theory that introduces heterogeneous firms (via a Pareto distributed productivity term) and fixed trade costs to the classic 2x2x2 monopolistic competition model of trade.
Here's the abstract:
This paper examines how country, industry, and firm characteristics interact in general equilibrium to determine nations’ responses to trade liberalization. When firms possess heterogeneous productivity, countries differ in relative factor abundance, and industries vary in factor intensity, falling trade costs induce reallocations of resources both within and across industries and countries. These reallocations generate substantial job turnover in all sectors, spur relatively more creative destruction in comparative advantage industries than in comparative disadvantage industries, and magnify ex ante comparative advantage to create additional welfare gains from trade. The improvements in aggregate productivity as countries liberalize dampen and can even reverse the real-wage losses of scarce factors.
This is clearly an improvement over existing models of trade with hetereogeneous firms, which often feature a numeraire that pins down the wage and labor as the only input. Now we get to talk about wage effects and comparative advantage! Unfortunately, the resulting mathematical complexity is such that closed-form solutions don't exist for some of the endogeneous variables. The authors have to resort to numerical simulations to describe some areas of interest. Nonetheless, I really like this paper.
Posted by Dingel at 06:09 PM | Comments (0)
July 30, 2007
Losses from anything
UNC's Karl Smith has posted an argument for protectionist policies (pdf) and invites us to tear it apart. In brief, he reiterates the well-known point that risk-averse agents will forego gambles with positive expected payoff if the gains are sufficiently small. He then applies this behavior to trade:
If the distribution of the gains and losses to trade are uncertain then this imposes a cost on the agents. If the net total gains from trade do not exceed the losses from uncertainty everyone can be worse off.
The document is titled "Losses from Trade," but if you read the six pages offered by Smith, you'll realize that this paper is not about trade. His "objections" and "conclusions" sections (the last two pages) don't even discuss international trade! Smith's argument applies to all aspects of life - risk aversion simiarly implies that stasis may be preferable to technological advances or institutional shifts that cause small net gains with distributional uncertainty. This line of reasoning is valid as a general argument against dynamism, not trade in particular.
Nonetheless, let's consider the application. Is trade that uncertain? As Dean Baker has complained, we know that typical US trade liberalization will tend to displace workers in labor-intensive manufacturing, while protecting radiologists and other white collar workers. Globally, French farmers oppose Doha, West African cotton growers favor it, and American doctors have nothing to worry about. The political economy story to investigate is how one interest group defeats another.
Perhaps trade liberalization implies more uncertainty generally. Is there a link to labor market churn? The (Ricardian) gains from trade are a result of reallocating resources across productive opportunities, but such sectoral shifts may be predictable. Do we have reason to believe (from theory or empirics) that lower trade barriers increase the separation rate for all workers?
And does protection imply greater certainty? Perhaps, but I'd have to reflect upon that topic for a while before feeling confident about my answer.
Nonetheless, suppose for now that the government has the ability to preserve the status quo. Risk aversion only rules out trade liberalization that produces small net gains. The implication would then be that we ought to have large spurts of bundled liberalization (WTO rounds, anyone?).
In sum, Dr. Smith has highlighted a potentially promising area of research, but I don't find his initial sketch very compelling. I'd need to see compelling empirical evidence on the relationships between trade and uncertainty before thinking we needed new theory to explain them.
Posted by Dingel at 08:33 PM | Comments (0)
June 14, 2007
Why compensate the losers in trade liberalization?
Julian Sanchez attacks trade protectionism:
Here's a modest proposal, then: Let's permit whatever restrictions on trade and globalization people like, but with the "winners" under those rules compensating the "losers" via some sort of special targeted tax. We'll levy this on the workers and stockholders enriched by whatever form of protection from international competition they want to demand, and cut a check to workers, stockholders, and consumers in other sectors that would have benefited from lower prices or operating costs as a function of trade and outsourcing, in the amount of whatever the benefit to them would have been of less restricted trade...The key thing to bear in mind here is that there's nothing morally special about the level of globalization in 2007 or 1990 or 1970 as some kind of special baseline. We talk about "winners" and "losers" relative to some status quo ante where there happened to be a different level and pattern of globalization, but the point of comparison is—from the point of view of justice, if not realpolitik—arbitrary. Which is why compensations from the "winners" to "losers" under protectionism makes as much sense—probably more—than the parallel sort of compensation as globalization increases. The only reason to think otherwise is to suppose we're specially and permanently entitled to the pattern of holdings we'd have at some particular but arbitrary level and kind of globalization.
Theory aside, given the strength of status quo bias, adjustment assistance or some other form of compensation is politically necessary to make trade liberalization feasible. Paying people to overcome their status quo bias echoes the political necessity of paying people to overcome another bias:
It is tempting to argue... that all changes require adjustment, and that assistance should be provided in a generic fashion... This viewpoint is valid in a cosmopolitan world... However, in the real world, the refusal to accept change - and hence the need to accomodate it and facilitate it through adjustment assistance - is greater when the source of disturbance is foreign... The case for differential adjustment assistance rests on this asymmetry in communities' attitudes toward change from foreign and domestic sources. [Bhagwati, Protectionism, p.118-9]
Trade adjustment assistance facilitates liberalization by dampening both of these biases. But it might not if the general public knew its effectiveness.
Posted by Dingel at 03:11 PM | Comments (0)
May 30, 2007
Heterogeneous firms, trade liberalization & "good jobs"
Don Davis & James Harrigan provide theoretical grounding for public worries in "Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and Trade Liberalization":
Globalization threatens "good jobs at good wages", according to overwhelming public sentiment. Yet professional discussion often rules out such concerns a priori. We instead offer a framework to interpret and address these concerns. We develop a model in which monopolistically competitive firms pay efficiency wages, and these firms differ in both their technical capability and their monitoring ability. Heterogeneity in the ability of firms to monitor effort leads to different wages for identical workers - good jobs and bad jobs - as well as equilibrium unemployment. Wage heterogeneity combines with differences in technical capability to generate an equilibrium size distribution of firms. As in Melitz (2003), trade liberalization increases aggregate efficiency through a firm selection effect. This efficiency-enhancing selection effect, however, puts pressure on many "good jobs", in the sense that the high-wage jobs at any level of technical capability are the least likely to survive trade liberalization. In a central case, trade raises the average real wage but leads to a loss of many "good jobs" and to a steady-state increase in unemployment.
Posted by Dingel at 11:00 PM | Comments (0)
April 28, 2007
Trade liberalization and prices
Advocates of globalization love to argue that free trade lowers prices, and the argument seems sensible enough. Think of all the cheap goods from China that we can buy at Wal-Mart. But anyone who understands comparative advantage knows that free trade affects relative prices, not the price level (the latter being the province of macro and monetary factors). When a country opens up to trade (or liberalizes its trade), it is the relative price of imports that comes down; by necessity, the relative prices of its exports must go up! Consumers are better off to the extent that their consumption basket is weighted towards importables, but we cannot always rely on this to be the case.
If Rodrik comes to play the same role in the blogosphere that he has in academia, I expect that many free traders will take an extra moment of reflection before hitting "post."
Posted by Dingel at 08:25 AM | Comments (0)
April 19, 2007
Importers
Kala Krishna and Ling Hui Tan model importers (pdf):
Why is it important to model the role of traders explicitly? We do so not simply to inject a dose of realism into the analysis but because the size of the import industry matters for the amount of trade that takes place and the consequent level of social welfare. And the size of the import industry, in turn, is affected by the costs and risks involved in importing. This is where our model differs from the standard partial equilibrium analysis of trade policy under perfect competition: by explicitly introducing entry costs and an element of uncertainty for all potential traders - factors that are crucial in determining the entry decisions of traders and ultimately, the outcome of trade policies - we show that neglecting the role of traders can lead one astray in evaluating the effects of various trade restrictions. Thus, the fundamental contribution of this paper lies in its implications for trade policy, which differ quite substantially from the norm.
Posted by Dingel at 08:00 PM | Comments (0)
March 18, 2007
Empirical Tests of Comparative Advantage
In Free Trade Under Fire
In 1859, a bit of gunboat diplomacy by Commodore Matthew Perry ended two centuries of Japanese autarky and exposed it to foreign trade. Japanese prices converged to world prices, so the country became an exporter of silk and tea while an importer of cotton and woolen goods. Estimates of these gains from trade are as high as nine percent. (Daniel Bernhofen & John Brown, "A Direct Test of the Theory of Comparative Advantage: The Case of Japan," JPE 2004, pdf; "An Empirical Assessment of the Comparative Advantage Gains from Trade: Evidence from Japan," AER 2005)
In 1807, President Thomas Jefferson ordered an economic embargo to punish Britain for interfering with American ships on the high seas. This termination of trade raised the domestic price of imported goods by 33 percent and lowered the domestic price of exported goods by 27 percent. The static welfare loss was around five percent. (Douglas Irwin, "The Welfare Cost of Autarky: Evidence from the Jeffersonian Trade Embargo, 1807–09," RIE 2005)
Neat.
Posted by Dingel at 09:27 AM | Comments (0)
November 12, 2006
A test of Melitz (2003) with regard to firm size
Virginia Di Nino, Rosen Marinov & Nadia Rocha - "Trade Liberalization and New Exporters’ Size: Theory and Evidence"
This paper tests an empirical implication of Melitz (2003) in the context of falling trade costs, using the EU’s intensive liberalization phase (1993−2002) as a natural experiment. Contrary to the model’s predictions, firms that switch from non-exporting to exporting over the studied period are not concentrated in a particular size range. Our findings, based on a rich data set of French manufacturing enterprises, suggest scope for fine-tuning of the theoretical framework.
Available here (pdf).
Posted by Dingel at 12:48 PM | Comments (0)
September 25, 2006
Globalization & Disaggregation
The Economic Council of Finland published a number of papers on globalization last week. Here's the summary of the lead article by Richard Baldwin:
Three eminent economists from Princeton University have recently argued that globalisation has entered a new phase that requires a new paradigm understand. This paper examines what is new in the new paradigm and considers the policy implications for Europe. Roughly speaking new-paradigm globalisation differs from the old in that it is occurring at a much finer level of disaggregation. Due to radical reductions in international communication and coordination costs, EU firms can offshore many tasks that were previously considered non-traded. This means that international competition – which used to be primarily between firms and sectors in different nations – now occurs between individual workers performing similar tasks in different nations. The really new feature is that deeper new-paradigm globalisation will seem quite unpredictable from the perspective of firms and sectors. Since individual tasks can be offshored, globalisation may help some workers in a given firm while harming others. Moreover, old-globalisation’s correlation between skill groups and winners and losers breaks down. Certain highly skilled tasks may turn out to be offshore-able, while other highly skilled tasks are not. Increased offshoring will therefore not systematically help or hurt skilled workers in the EU. In particular, many “Information Society” jobs are prone to offshoring so EU policies aimed at moving workers into Information Society jobs may be wasted since those jobs are only ‘good jobs’ because they do not yet face direct international competition. The paper argues that this has important implications for the EU’s competitiveness strategy, education strategy, welfare states, and industrial policy. The underlying theme is that the increased unpredictability should make EU leaders more cautious about moving workers or skills in a particular direction. Flexibility is, as always, the key to allowing Europe to seize the opportunities of globalisation while minimizing the adjustment costs.
The three economists at Princeton cited by Baldwin are Gene Grossman, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, and Alan Blinder. The two Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg papers on offshoring are available at Grossman's website. Blinder's article is his March Foreign Affairs article, with which most readers of this blog are probably familiar.
Posted by Dingel at 11:52 AM | Comments (1)
Trade and Exchange Rates
"One of the fundamental tenets of free trade is that currencies should float -- or at the very least, move along with market forces." True or False? Explain.
Greg Mankiw discusses.
Posted by Dingel at 11:22 AM | Comments (1)
September 21, 2006
"Gravity for Dummies and Dummies for Gravity Equations"
A new NBER working paper by Richard Baldwin and Daria Taglioni looks like an important extension of the Anderson-van Wincoop approach for trade gravity model fans:
This paper provides a minimalist derivation of the gravity equation and uses it to identify three common errors in the literature, what we call the gold, silver and bronze medal errors. The paper provides estimates of the size of the biases taking the currency union trade effect as an example. We generalize Anderson-Van Wincoop's multilateral trade resistance factor (which only works with cross section data) to allow for panel data and then show that it can be dealt with using time-varying country dummies with omitted determinants of bilateral trade being dealt with by time-invariant pair dummies.
I'll get a chance to read the paper next week when I have NBER access, and then I'll know if "Gravity for Dummies" incorporated the "Log of Gravity."
Posted by Dingel at 02:46 PM | Comments (0)
September 13, 2006
Trade Gains & Pains; Concentrated & Diffuse
In the United States, at least, the problem is that most beneficiaries from globalization don't really know that they are beneficiaries, or how much they benefit.
Brad Setser, via MR:
Walmart’s customers are diffuse and unorganized. Walmart itself is not. The customers of US electronics firms that source production in China are diffuse. But the US firms that make money off the China trade, and benefit from China’s willingness to sell its “assembly services” on the cheap, are a rather concentrated interest. And when it comes to the politics of trade, it seems to me like the customer – represented by the firms that organize global supply chains – usually win, at least on the big issues of real importance to global firms (liberalizing agricultural trade isn’t one of them).
Richard Baldwin (pdf):
To understand juggernaut liberalisation of intra-industry trade, it is necessary to reach for the very latest trade theories, the so-called new-new trade theory (Melitz 2003, Eaton and Kortum 2002). These models allow for differences in firm size and efficiency and explain why the largest, most efficient firms export while smaller firms sell only domestically. In addition to matching many important aspects of reality, this implies that there is what might be called ‘intra-sectoral special interest politics’. In the new-new trade models, reciprocal trade liberalisation raises the profits of big export firms while lowering the profit of small firms in the same industry that sell only in the local market (Falvey, Greenaway and Yu 2004, Baldwin and Forslid 2004). The intuition is simple. Reciprocal liberalisation harms small firms that sell only locally since it raises the degree of competition they face; they have no exports to benefit from the expanded foreign market access. This leads to a downsizing of such firms with some of them exiting the industry. For the big firms, by contrast, the extra competition at home is offset by better market access abroad. On net they gain since their sales benefit from the downsizing and exit of small firms in both markets. Turning from the economic impact of reciprocal liberalisation to the political economy aspect, the key fact is that there are many more small firms than big firms. Thus, Olsen’s Asymmetry suggests that industries engaged in intra-industry trade will tend to be pro-liberalisation. Notice the juggernaut’s liberalisation-begets-liberalisation features of this mechanism. Big exporting firms drive the liberalisation of sectors marked by intra-industry trade since they are better organised politically than the small firms in the same sector, and the liberalisation itself downsizes the anti-trade small firms while upsizing the pro-trade big firms.
This approach to political economy suggests structural reasons to be optimistic about freer trade, despite the Doha round's struggles.
Posted by Dingel at 12:09 PM | Comments (0)
September 04, 2006
Cleaning Up the Kichen Sink
I haven't finished reading "Cleaning Up the Kitchen Sink" (pdf) by Francisco Rodriguez, but the first nine pages are compelling enough for me to pass it along anyway.
Rodriguez goes into the archives to revisit Mankiw-Romer-Weil and the models from which linear regression specifications are derived in growth theory. When authors toss in a vector of variables of interest in addition to the standard measures of initial GDP, human capital, etc, they almost always assume that the variables of interest (malaria, institutions, etc) are linearly related to growth. Of course, that doesn't jive very well with good economic theory (for example, binding constrants and the theory of the second best). Rodriguez argues that the ad hoc introduction of quadratic terms and interaction variables is not a sufficient remedy.
What if the non-linearity is more complex than what can be captured by a set of simple quadratic and linear interaction terms? As I discuss below, if this is the case then most of the regressions currently estimated suffer from misspecification bias, making the type of inferences commonly drawn from their estimation invalid. Furthermore, the data requirements of estimating truly non-linear functions can be quite demanding and far outstrip the availability of data in currently existing data sets.This problem is more than a theoretical curiosum. A systematic exploration of the theoretical foundations of the linear growth specification reveals that the set of assumptions necessary to justify fitting a linear function to the data is so restrictive as to practically make the linear specification the true theoretical curiosum. I suggest that the starting framework for an exploration of the growth evidence should be a specification that allows for a general set of interactions between the set of potential production function shifters.
[Hat tip: AdamSmithee]
Posted by Dingel at 07:47 PM | Comments (0)
July 29, 2006
Helpman: "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms"
A paper (pdf) from Professor Elhanan Helpman surveys an exciting recent strand of international trade theory literature. The new approach models choices by individual firms in monopolistically competitive markets and considers the relationships amongst firm productivity, trade costs, and average productivity levels. A particularly striking aspect is the degree to which traditional Ricardian features emerge from models emphasizing heterogeneity within and across industries.
New developments in the world economy have called for new developments in the theory of international trade and foreign directed investment, designed to better understand the shifts in trade and investment patterns and the reorganization of production across national boarders... [T]heoretical refinements have focused on the individual firm, studying its choices in response to its own characteristics, the nature of the industry in which it operates, and the opportunities afforded by foreign trade and investment. Important among these choices are modes of serving foreign markets and sourcing strategies.But the theory went beyond the individual firm, studying the implications of firm behavior for the structure of an industry, and, by implication, structural differences across industries. These variations deliver new explanations for trade structure and patterns of FDI, both within and across industries. For example, they identify new sources of comparative advantage, such as the degree of heterogeneity within industries and the quality of contracting institutions.
Heterogeneity plays a key role in this literature in two ways. First, there is heterogeneity as a result of productivity differences across firms within industries, because some firms happen to be luckier than others. Second, there is heterogeneity in organizational form. The two are related, however, because differences in productivity induce different choices for the organization of production and distribution. In this theory, trade and FDI patterns are jointly determined with organizational structures, such as sourcing and integration strategies.
Posted by Dingel at 05:04 PM | Comments (0)
July 27, 2006
Can South-South trade liberalisation stimulate North-South trade?
That's the title of a recent working paper by Frederic Robert-Nicoud and Marco Fugazza. The abstract:
This paper uses a combination of Ethier (1982) and Melitz (2003) models to show that liberalizing trade among developing countries, so-called South-South trade, could contribute to improve the access to international markets of would-be exporters of developing countries. Lower trade barriers among developing countries has the effect of lowering the price of intermediate inputs and eventually allows exporters in those countries to serve international markets. We also compare unilateral and multilateral South-South trade liberalization and find that the latter unambiguously reduces the price of intermediates in all participating countries, whereas the former has ambiguous effects.
The argument is only theoretical at this point, as the authors are in the process of gathering data to test their model.
Posted by Dingel at 11:51 AM | Comments (0)
February 20, 2006
When does infant industry protectionism work?
What elements must be present for protectionism a la the infant industry argument to improve national welfare? Here's a brief sketch:
(1) Firms can dynamically improve their productivity through learning-by-doing or economies of scale.
(2) There must be a domestic market failure and the first-best governmental intervention to remedy that failure must be unavailable. (Bhagwati & Ramaswami 1963)
(3) The bureaucracy must be technically competent so as to identify the industries that may benefit from protection as well as the degree and duration of protection that would be optimal. (Krueger 1997)
(4) The bureaucracy must be sufficiently insulated so as to resist capture by special interests. Otherwise, the industry will likely receive protection until it is a senile elder in diapers. (Krugman 1987)
(5) The protection must not merely bring later entrants forward in time, which would actually hurt the pioneering firm (Baldwin 1969).
(6) The gains from protection must not be countered by the potential for immiserizing growth when productivity increases in the protected sector, as described by Johnson (1967).
What other circumstances (market or government) are relevant to the potential for infant industry protection to be good policy?
Posted by Dingel at 05:42 PM | Comments (1)
July 26, 2005
Wikipedia on New Trade Theory
It looks like the Wikipedia entry on "new trade theory" could use some work. For example, the initial summary currently reads:
New Trade Theory (NTT) is the economic critique of international free trade from the perspective of increasing returns to scale and the network effect. Beginning in the 1970s some economists asked whether it might be effective for a nation to shelter infant industries until they had grown to sufficient size to compete internationally.
New trade theory is a methodological alternative to pure trade theory, not a critique of a policy position. New trade theory explains international trade in terms of monopolistic competition, whereas traditional theory assumes perfect competition.
For example, under pure trade theory, two absolutely identical countries (with identical factor endowments) would not gain from trade (especially in the presence of international transport costs). Under new trade theory, however, gains from trade would occur due to increasing returns to scale. This is the classic argument from Adam Smith that specialization is limited by the extent of the market, and that greater specialization results in greater productivity.
The long dominance of Ricardo over Smith – of comparative advantage over increasing returns – was largely due to the belief that the alternative was necessarily a mess. In effect, the theory of international trade followed the perceived line of least mathematical resistance. [Paul Krugman, Rethinking International Trade, p.4]
The wikipedia entry is misleading, because it emphasizes the possibility for protectionism to be welfare-improving under new trade theory, rather than the nature and content of the theory itself. The importance of new trade theory is its examination of how models featuring imperfectly competitive markets both reinforce and alter our traditional views of trade, not the fact that it might breathe new life into the infant industry argument (unless one is not a theorist, but a protectionist hunting for a theory).
Traditional theory is the usual basis for advocating free trade… the new trade theory suggests a more complex view. The potential gains from trade are even larger in a world of increasing returns, and thus, in a way, the case for free trade is all the stronger. On the other hand… new trade models show that it is possible (not certain) that such tools as export subsidies, temporary tariffs, and so on, may shift world specialization in a way favorable to the protecting nation. [Rethinking International Trade, p.3]
Thus, new trade theory provides an explanation for international trade wholly independent of comparative advantage. The Wikipedia entry summary ought to emphasize that Adam Smith's contributions to international economics complement those of David Ricardo, rather than obsessing over the potential for free trade to be sub-optimal.
[New trade theory is not my specialty. Please note any errors or contrasting interpretations in the comments. Thanks.]
Posted by Dingel at 09:31 PM | Comments (1)